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Abstract 
From the early 1900s, some psychologists have attempted to establish their discipline as a 
quantitative science. In using quantitative methods to investigate their theories, they adopted 
their own special definition of measurement of attributes such as cognitive abilities, as though 
they were quantities of the type encountered in Newtonian science. Joel Michell has 
presented a carefully reasoned argument that psychological attributes lack additivity, and 
therefore cannot be quantities in the same way as the attributes of classical Newtonian 
physics. In the early decades of the 20th century, quantum theory superseded Newtonian 
mechanics as the best model of physical reality. This paper gives a brief, critical overview of 
the evolution of current measurement practices in psychology, and suggests the need for a 
transition from a Newtonian to a quantum theoretical paradigm for psychological 
measurement. Finally, a case study is presented that considers the implications of a quantum 
theoretical model for educational measurement. In particular, it is argued that, since the 
OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is predicated on a 
Newtonian conception of measurement, this may constrain the extent to which it can make 
accurate comparisons of the achievements of different education systems. 
Keywords 
psychological measurement, Newtonian, quantum-theoretical, PISA 
1 
 
Introduction 
From the advent of modern psychology in the 19th century, some psychologists have sought 
to establish their discipline as a quantitative science. The 19th century German philosopher 
and physicist Gustav Theodor Fechner invested considerable effort in attempting to establish 
the relationship between nature and spirit (Geist). In studying the links between the mental 
and physical realms, Fechner (1860) devised methods for describing the relation between 
external physical stimuli and mental states, such as sensations. Through his study of the so-
called psychophysics, Fechner was able to gain insights into the philosophical mind-body 
problem. However, as Heidelberger (2004, p. 2) notes, “the most significant and renowned 
outcome of his [Fechner’s] endeavour was psychophysics, which became the foundation for 
quantitative empirical psychology.” Fechner’s pivotal role in the establishment of 
quantitative psychology was acknowledged by Boring (1929, p. 286): 
Of course, it is true that, without Fechner or a substitute which the times would almost 
inevitably have raised up, there might still have been an experimental psychology. ... 
There would, however, have been little of the breath of science in the experimental 
body, for we hardly recognize a subject as scientific if measurement is not one of its 
tools. Fechner, because of what he did and the time at which he did it, set experimental 
quantitative psychology off upon the course which it has followed. 
Therefore, the establishment of psychology as a scientific discipline was dependent upon the 
ability of its pioneers to devise valid and reliable methods for measuring psychological 
phenomena. This viewpoint was endorsed by, amongst others, Spearman (1937, p.89): 
But great as may be the potency of this [experimental method] ... there is yet another 
one so vital that, if lacking it, any study is thought by many authorities not to be 
scientific in the full sense of the word. This further and crucial method is that of 
measurement, or rather of mathematics; for this latter is what science really needs. 
2 
 
The current paper describes the key milestones in the development of measurement 
theory in psychology and critically evaluates the theoretical basis of current approaches to 
psychological measurement. The relevance of the early views of Euclid on measurement are 
considered in addition to the contributions of more recent prominent thinkers, such as Joel 
Michell, who has undertaken extensive work on the foundations of psychological 
measurement. It is argued that Michell’s (1990, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2011, 
2012) work demonstrates there is no overlap between the principles underpinning 
psychological measurement and those underpinning the measurement of dynamic attributes 
of macroscopic objects in Newtonian physics. Rather, it is suggested that a quantum 
theoretical framework may provide a more secure basis for psychological measurement. 
Furthermore, a case study is presented that considers the implications of a quantum 
theoretical model for educational measurement. In particular, it is argued that, since the 
OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is predicated on a 
Newtonian conception of measurement, this may constrain the extent to which it can make 
accurate comparisons of the achievements of different education systems. 
 
Newtonian versus quantum theoretical measurement 
In Newtonian physics, macroscopic objects possess their dynamic attributes intrinsically, and 
measurement is a mechanism for checking up on the values of those attributes. For example, 
when an apple falls to the ground, it possesses a definite velocity at each point on its path 
irrespective of whether the velocity is actually being measured. A measurement of the 
velocity simply yields a description of a pre-existing reality. One of the striking features of 
quantum theory is the pivotal role played by participation: the physicist no longer stands back 
and offers an objective description of what unfolds when an apple falls to the ground. Rather, 
measurement influences and does not merely check up on something that already exists. 
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Heisenberg (1958/2000, p. 22) asserts: “In classical physics science started from the 
belief – or should one say from the illusion? – that we could describe the world or at least 
parts of the world without any reference to ourselves”. However, in contrast to Kantian 
philosophy, the role played by human beings can never be purged from the fundamental 
conceptual problems of quantum theory. Heisenberg makes frequent reference to the role of 
the observer when discussing the measurement problem in quantum theory: 
This again emphasizes a subjective element in the description of atomic events, since 
the measuring device has been constructed by the observer, and we have to remember 
that what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our method of 
questioning. ... In this way quantum theory reminds us, as Bohr has put it, of the old 
wisdom that when searching for harmony in life one must never forget that in the drama 
of existence we are ourselves both players and spectators. (Heisenberg, 1958/2000, pp. 
24-25) 
Bohr’s appeal to the notion that the physicist is both player and spectator is a reference to a 
fundamental quandary in quantum theory whereby the observer, in effect, influences, at least 
in part, what he or she observes. This does not, however, render quantum theory subjective. 
Rather, the strong objectivity of classical Newtonian mechanics gives way to quantum 
theoretical weak objectivity or inter-subjectivity. Wheeler (1996), who worked with Bohr on 
the explanation of nuclear fission, claims: “We are inescapably involved in bringing about 
that which appears to be happening” (p. 120) and “Useful as it is under everyday 
circumstances to say that the world exists ‘out there’ independent of us, that view can no 
longer be upheld. There is a strange sense in which this is a ‘participatory universe’” (p. 126). 
Newell (1973), in his paper “You can’t play 20 questions with nature and win”, 
argues that much research in cognitive psychology consists of asking binary questions and 
doing experimental work to study various psychological phenomena. In other words, 
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researchers consider a particular behavioural phenomenon and posit theories about the 
organisation of the mind required to produce the behaviour, generally leading to binary 
questions concerning whether theory A or theory B is appropriate. Newell stresses that, 
although such research has important contributions to make to our understanding of human 
behaviour, the focus needs to shift from answering questions to developing good models of 
how the whole system of the mind works. 
Wheeler (1996) makes use of the game of “20 questions” to contrast classical and 
quantum measurement and to highlight the role of participation. The orthodox approach to 
the game illustrates Newtonian measurement. A group of people send one of their number 
outside a room while they select a word. The object of the game is for the person to return 
and try to identify the word using at most 20 questions (each soliciting one bit of information) 
such as: “Is it an animal?”, “Is it a mineral?”, “Is it pink?” The unorthodox version of the 
game illustrates the participatory nature of quantum measurement. In this case a word is not 
selected in advance by those in the room. 
Each person in the room can answer as he or she pleases provided the word that the 
person thinks of is compatible with the responses to all prior questioning. For example, 
suppose the first person questioned is asked, “Is it expensive?” If that person responds in the 
negative, the second person must think of something which, whatever its other properties are, 
is not expensive. Assume that the second person thinks of the word “sock” and the questioner 
asks, “Is it something you wear?” The third person must then think of something which isn’t 
expensive but can be worn. As the questions continue the game becomes increasingly 
demanding for the people in the room. In the “Newtonian” version of the game, there is a 
word in the room to be discovered. In the “quantum” version of the game, there is not a word 
in the room. In this case the word is determined by the sequence of questions the person asks 
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when he or she re-enters the room. The person playing the Newtonian game is a mere 
observer while the person in the quantum version is an actor as well as an observer. 
In the Newtonian case, the word is already in the room waiting to be discovered and 
the questioner who succeeds in finding the word is merely unearthing something which pre-
exists his or her questions. In the quantum version there is no word in the room and the 
questioner participates in the selection of the word; changing his or her question sequence 
will change the word. This sheds light on Heisenberg’s (1958/2000, p. 25) aphorism: “what 
we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our method of questioning”. It also 
explains why psychology will search in vain for what intelligence is, for example. The 
psychologist is both actor and spectator. When the psychologist selects some items for IQ 
tests and rejects others, he or she is, in part, already defining intelligence. This is the 
psychologist as participator. Subsequently the psychologist studies response patterns in 
search of consistencies which may throw light on the nature of intelligence. This is the 
psychologist construed as mere observer. Unfortunately, this dual role condemns the 
psychologist to a fruitless search for that pre-existing “word in the room”. A Newtonian 
model for the measurement of psychological predicates therefore appears to be under strain in 
the context of this example. 
 
The classical concept of measurement 
The classical concept of measurement is predicated on the fact that all measurable attributes 
are quantitative. One of the earliest treatments of measurement was given in Book V of 
Euclid’s Elements (Heath, 1956). 
Aristotle divided quantities into multitudes (discrete quantities), e.g., number of 
people in a room, and magnitudes (continuous quantities), e.g., length of a field. Aristotle 
defined a quantity thus: “We call a quantity that which is divisible into constituent parts of 
6 
 
which each is by nature a one and a “this”. A quantity is a multitude if it is numerable, a 
magnitude if it is measurable.” (cited in Stein, 1990, p. 164)  
One quantity was said to be a measure of another if the latter was a whole-numbered 
multiple of the former. Clearly this notion of measure was appropriate for multitudes (which 
can, for example, be regarded as whole-numbered multiples of one) but, in general, it is not 
applicable to magnitudes since pairs of magnitudes may be incommensurable, i.e., no whole-
numbered multiple of one of them may be equal to some whole-numbered multiple of the 
other (e.g., the lengths of the side and the diagonal of a square are incommensurable). 
Therefore, Euclid’s challenge was to generalise the concept of measure to render it applicable 
to an arbitrary magnitude relative to any unit. Euclid achieved this generalisation by 
introducing the concept of ratio: “A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size between two 
magnitudes of the same kind.” (Book V, Definition 3) (Heath, 1956, p. 114) He augmented 
this definition by adding: “Magnitudes are said to have a ratio to one another which are 
capable, when multiplied, of exceeding one another.” (Book V, Definition 4) (Heath, 1956, p. 
114) 
Euclid stated what it means for magnitudes to be in the same ratio in Book V, 
Definition 5: 
Magnitudes are said to be in the same ratio, the first to the second and the third to the 
fourth, when, if any equimultiples whatever be taken of the first and third, and any 
equimultiples whatever of the second and fourth, the former equimultiples alike exceed, 
are alike equal to, or alike fall short of, the latter equimultiples respectively taken in 
corresponding order. (Book V, Definition 5) (Heath, 1956, p. 114)  
This rather antiquated explanation of what it means for magnitudes to be in the same ratio can 
be more fully understood by realising it is equivalent to stating that two ratios of magnitudes, 
xw :  and zy : , are the same if and only if, for all pairs of natural numbers m and n , 
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1. xmwn >  if and only if zmyn >  
2. xmwn =  if and only if zmyn =  
3. xmwn <  if and only if zmyn <  
Therefore, any specific ratio of magnitudes is completely characterised by three classes of 
rational numbers, i.e., for any pair of magnitudes, w and x, of the same quantity, xw :  is 
characterised by the three classes: 
1. 





 >= xmwn
n
mC :1  
2. 





 == xmwn
n
mC :2  
3. 





 <= xmwn
n
mC :3  
If w and x are commensurable, the class 2C  is non-empty and any member of this class is 
equal to the ratio xw : . If, on the other hand, w and x are incommensurable, the class 2C  is 
empty and, in this case, xw :  is not characterised by a particular numerical ratio but, rather, 
by the classes 1C  and 3C  in the sense that it is the ratio that falls between these two classes. 
Therefore, if a particular magnitude, x, is taken as a unit, any other magnitude of the 
same kind, w, can be characterised relative to x by one of the following two approaches: 
1. If 
n
m
x
w
=   where m and n are natural numbers, then 
n
m  is the measure of w in units of 
x, or 
2. If 
n
m
x
w
≠  where m and n are natural numbers, then the measure of w in units of x is 
only approximated by a rational number, although the approximation can be to an 
arbitrary degree of precision. 
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Euclid’s work in Book V of the Elements therefore provided a basic framework for 
understanding the concept of measurement, albeit in terms of rational approximations for 
incommensurable magnitudes. 
 
Quantitative structure and measurement in Newtonian physics 
In Newtonian physics, attributes such as length possess a quantitative structure and they are 
known as quantities. A specific value of a quantity is known as a magnitude of that quantity. 
Magnitudes of a quantity are taken to be measurable since, due to their inherent quantitative 
structure, they can sustain ratios to one another that are expressible as real numbers. 
Although quantitative science has been in existence since at least the time of Euclid, the 
explicit characteristics of quantitative structure were only formulated at the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th century. Hölder (1901) devised a set of seven axioms 
that define the concept of a continuous measurable quantity. Hölder stipulates that an 
attribute Q is a measurable quantity if and only if it satisfies the following seven conditions 
(Michell, 1999, pp. 52-53): 
1. Any two magnitudes of Q are either identical or different and, if they are different, 
one is always greater than the other. This means that, given any two magnitudes, w 
and x, of Q, exactly one of the following is true: 
i. w is identical to x ( xw = , wx = ), or 
ii. w is greater than x and x is less than w ( xw > , wx < ), or 
iii. x is greater than w and w is less than x ( wx > , xw < ). 
2. For every magnitude of Q there exists one that is less. In other words, for every 
magnitude, w, of Q, there exists a magnitude, x, of Q such that wx < . 
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3. For every pair of magnitudes of Q there exists another magnitude, their sum, which is 
well-defined. Thus, for every ordered pair of (not necessarily distinct) magnitudes, w 
and x, of Q, there exists a magnitude, y, of Q such that yxw =+ . 
4. Every sum of two magnitudes of Q is greater than each individual magnitude involved 
in the sum, so that for all magnitudes, w and x, of Q wxw >+  and xxw >+ . 
5. If one magnitude of Q is less than another, then there exists a third magnitude of Q 
which makes up the difference between them. Hence, for any magnitudes, w and x of 
Q, if xw < , then there exist magnitudes a and b of Q such that xaw =+  and 
xwb =+ . 
6. The sum of three magnitudes of Q is identical irrespective of whether it is the addition 
of the third to the sum of the first two, or the addition of the first to the sum of the last 
two. In other words, for all magnitudes, w, x and y, of Q, )()( yxwyxw ++=++ . 
7. Given any two non-empty classes of magnitudes of Q, an ‘upper’ and a ‘lower’ class, 
such that each magnitude of Q belongs to either class but not to both, and each 
magnitude of the upper class is greater than any of the lower, there must exist a 
magnitude of Q that is no greater than any in the upper class and no less than any in 
the lower class, i.e., there must be a least upper bound of the lower class. Hence, there 
must exist a magnitude z of Q such that every zz <′  belongs to the lower class and 
every zz >′  belongs to the upper class. 
If the above seven conditions are satisfied by Q, then Q is a quantity and, as such, it can 
be measured. Quantities can be subdivided into extensive and intensive quantities. An 
extensive quantity is one whose additive nature (i.e., conditions 3 to 6 above) is self-evident 
from the behaviour of some objects that demonstrate magnitudes of the quantity. Length is an 
obvious example of an extensive quantity since its additive structure can be illustrated 
directly by using a set of rigid, straight rods. If two of the rods are combined end to end, the 
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concatenated length of the rods is equal to the sum of their individual lengths. An intensive 
quantity, such as density, is one whose additivity is not obviously demonstrable by concrete 
means. 
Hölder’s seven axioms render it possible to prove that every magnitude of a quantity is 
in fact measurable relative to an arbitrary magnitude as the unit of measurement. Consider 
any magnitude, w, of a quantity, Q, and define www +=2 , wwww ++= )(3 , 
wwwww +++= ))((4  and so on, so that, for a general natural number, n, 
wwnnw +−= )1( . Then, for a given pair of magnitudes, w and x, and a given pair of natural 
numbers, m and n, 
1. 
n
m  is what Hölder terms a “lower fraction” in relation to the ratio xw :  if and only if 
mxnw > , and 
2. 
n
m  is what Hölder terms an “upper fraction” in relation to the ratio xw :  if and only 
if mxnw ≤ . 
In other words, the measure (ratio) of magnitude w relative to magnitude x as the unit is 
located via an ordered sequence of positive rational numbers. At first sight this appears to be 
the same method as Euclid used for specifying when two ratios of magnitudes are equal. 
However, Hölder’s approach goes much further since his method of locating ratios of 
magnitudes actually matches the ratios uniquely with positive real numbers. Dedekind (1872) 
observed that every positive real number is a least upper bound, or cut, of a non-empty class 
of rational numbers. Ratios of magnitudes correspond to classes of lower fractions and, 
according to Dedekind (1872), each class of lower fractions corresponds to its own least 
upper bound (cut). Accordingly, therefore, Hölder proved that every ratio of magnitudes is 
associated with a positive real number and, in this way, he showed that the measure of one 
magnitude relative to another magnitude as unit corresponds to a unique positive real number. 
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Therefore, for any magnitudes, w and x, of the same quantity, the magnitude of w relative to x 
may always be expressed by a positive real number, r, where rxw = . In other words, the 
ratio of w to x is a positive real number, r, which gives the measure of w in units of x. 
Only continuous quantities, i.e., those that satisfy Hölder’s axioms, are measurable in 
the traditional sense of the term. The process of identifying if a particular attribute is 
measurable is straightforward for extensive physical quantities, such as length and weight. 
However, for intensive physical quantities such as density and for psychological attributes, 
the process for identifying measurability is much more complex. 
 
The measurability of psychological attributes 
There is a widespread view within psychology that some psychological attributes can be 
subjected to the process of measurement (Michell, 1990, 1997, 1999). The 14th century 
French scholar Nicole Oresme considered the possibility of measuring psychological 
variables (Michell, 1990, p. 7), and there was a renewed focus on the measurability of 
psychological phenomena after the scientific revolution. For example, in 1725, Francis 
Hutcheson published his mathematical theory of the psychological basis of moral behaviour 
and judgment, which was discussed by Brooks and Aalto (1981). Hutcheson posited that the 
“moment of good” of an individual (a measure of the positive impact on the public of the 
individual’s actions) is related to his benevolence and abilities thus: 
ABM ×=  
where M = moment of good of individual 
 B = measure of individual’s benevolence 
 A = measure of individual’s abilities. (Brooks and Aalto, 1981, pp. 347-348) 
In a similar manner, Hutcheson related the “moment of evil” of an individual (a measure of 
the amount of evil produced by the individual) to the strength of his malice and abilities: 
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AH ×=µ  
where μ = moment of evil of individual 
 H = measure of individual’s malice 
 A = measure of individual’s abilities. (Brooks and Aalto, 1981, p. 348) 
Fechner, however, was the first to propose actual methods for measuring psychological 
attributes, which is why he is regarded as the father of modern quantitative psychology. 
Michell (1999) argues that there are five main reasons for psychologists adopting the 
stance that certain psychological attributes are measurable: 
1. The inclination of psychologists to model their discipline on quantitative natural 
science, and physics in particular. 
After the scientific revolution, quantitative physics was considered to be the gold 
standard of scientific success because of its capacity to accurately model and predict 
the behaviour of physical systems. Emerging sciences such as psychology were 
therefore modelled upon physics because of its obvious success. The German 
psychologist, Ebbinghaus, commented on this tendency: “The brilliant results 
produced in natural science by measurement and calculation readily suggested the 
idea that something similar might be done for psychology.” (Ebbinghaus, 1908, p.13) 
2. An inherent belief that the attainment of precision and exactness could only be 
obtained through measurement. 
Some prominent psychologists, such as Cattell, saw the exactness of measurement as 
a reason for incorporating it into their discipline: “Psychology cannot attain the 
certainty and exactness of the physical sciences, unless it rests on a foundation of 
experiment and measurement” (Cattell, 1890, p. 373). 
3. Pythagoreanism, the metaphysical view attributed to Pythagoras, that all things are 
composed of numbers. 
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This doctrine, which persisted for many centuries as a central tenet of European 
thought, can be taken to mean that all attributes are essentially quantitative but their 
quantitative nature is sometimes veiled by human perception. If Pythagoreanism is 
accepted, it follows that psychological attributes are quantitative and, theoretically, 
measurable. 
4. The quantitative imperative: the view that measurement is vital in a discipline if it is 
to be considered scientific. 
The quantitative imperative originated from the belief that all science is quantitative 
and, as an aspiring science, psychology must therefore be quantitative. This stance 
was supported by the English psychometrician Francis Galton, who claimed that 
“until the phenomena of any branch of knowledge have been submitted to 
measurement and number, it cannot assume the status and dignity of a science” 
(Galton, 1879, p. 149). 
5. The need to market psychology as a quantitative discipline due to the widespread 
acceptance of Pythagoreanism and the quantitative imperative in the 19th century 
scientific community. 
Michell (1999) opines that, to effectively promote psychology as a science in the 19th 
century, it was necessary to market it as a quantitative discipline. 
 
The Ferguson committee 
In 1932, a committee of nineteen scientists was established by the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science to investigate the validity of psychological measurement practices. 
The Ferguson Committee, as it became known, was chaired by the physicist A. Ferguson, and 
consisted of a number of psychologists and others from outside the ranks of the psychology 
profession including the physicist N. R. Campbell. 
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The contribution of J. Guild was a cornerstone of the Ferguson Committee’s 
deliberations. Guild (1938) set the scene by giving an account of Campbell’s theory of 
fundamental and derived measurement. Guild indicated that fundamental measurement 
involves the numerical representation of an empirically determined analogue of numerical 
addition, while derived measurement entails the discovery of constants that are functionally 
related to fundamental measures through numerical laws. Guild proceeded to argue that, in 
experimental psychophysics, psychologists did not establish an analogue of numerical 
addition for sensory intensities and, consequently, measurement of sensation intensities did 
not constitute fundamental measurement. Guild also stipulated that, since there were no 
fundamental measurements implicated in psychophysical measurement, neither could there 
be any derived measurements. Guild (1938, p. 328) therefore concluded that psychophysical 
measurement did not actually exist, and he applied his arguments to both Fechner’s sensation 
intensities and to a later psychophysical concept known as sense-distances: “We must 
conclude therefore that sensation intensity is not measurable ... It is not measurable in any 
sense of the term”. Guild’s arguments in relation to Fechner’s work were accepted by the 
Ferguson Committee, but there was greater resistance to his criticisms in relation to sense-
distances. 
Both the interim and final reports of the Ferguson Committee, published in 1938 and 
1940 respectively, were somewhat equivocal in their conclusions. Campbell and his 
supporters clearly won the debate, but there remained uncertainty about the validity of the 
measurement of sense-distances. However, despite the uncertainties pertaining to some 
aspects of psychophysical measurement, psychologists were left in no doubt overall that their 
measurement practices were somewhat dubious. For example, in the final report of the 
Ferguson Committee, Guild commented: 
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To insist on calling these other processes measurement adds nothing to their actual 
significance but merely debases the coinage of verbal intercourse. Measurement is not a 
term with some mysterious inherent meaning, part of which may have been overlooked 
by physicists and may be in course of discovery by psychologists. It is merely a word 
conventionally employed to denote certain ideas. To use it to denote other ideas does 
not broaden its meaning but destroys it: we cease to know what is to be understood by 
the term when we encounter it; our pockets have been picked of a useful coin ... 
(Ferguson et al., 1940, p. 345) 
The Ferguson Committee had considered the Sone scale for the measurement of perceived 
loudness, which was devised by S. S. Stevens and, therefore, Stevens took a special interest 
in the work of the Committee. Stevens responded to the dilemma that psychology was faced 
with by proposing, in 1946, a new definition of measurement in psychology. 
 
Stevens’ definition of measurement in psychology 
Stevens (1946, p. 677) redefined measurement as “the assignment of numerals to objects or 
events according to rules”. This definition is now widely accepted within psychology. For 
example, Michell (1997) indicates that, in a survey of psychology books published between 
the early 1950s and the early 1990s, he found that, of 44 books which included a definition of 
measurement, 39 of those gave a definition either identical to, or similar to, Stevens’ 1946 
definition. Michell also confirmed that none of the 44 definitions he considered were 
remotely like the traditional scientific concept of measurement. Michell (1997, p. 360) 
opines: “These observations confirm that psychology, as a discipline, has its own definition 
of measurement, a definition quite unlike the traditional concept used in the physical 
sciences”. 
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According to the traditional view of measurement, when an attribute is measured there 
is an attempt to determine ratios between magnitudes of the attribute. Therefore, 
measurement in the traditional sense is only possible for attributes which possess a 
quantitative structure, i.e., those which satisfy Hölder’s axioms. However, according to 
Stevens’ definition, measurement of non-quantitative attributes would be distinctly possible 
because numerical assignments could be made to the attributes using an arbitrary rule. Ellis 
(1966, p. 39) commented upon the unsatisfactory nature of Stevens’ definition of 
measurement: 
[I]t is doubtful whether this definition of measurement [Stevens’ definition] is really 
satisfactory. There is no doubt that measurement always involves the assignment of 
numerals to things according to rule, but if no restrictions are placed on the nature of 
the rule, it seems to admit far too much. 
Stevens (1946) stressed that numerals can be assigned to objects or events using different 
types of rules, and he proceeded to develop his notorious theory of the four possible types of 
measurement scales: nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio. Stevens (1946, p. 677) stipulated 
that: “The problem then becomes that of making explicit (a) the various rules for the 
assignment of numerals, (b) the mathematical properties (or group structure) of the resulting 
scales, and (c) the statistical operations applicable to measurements made with each type of 
scale.” 
In Stevens’ opinion, measurement is possible since there is an isomorphism between 
empirical relations pertaining to the attributes of objects and properties of numerical 
structures: “The isomorphism between these properties of the numeral series and certain 
empirical operations which we perform with objects permits the use of the series as a model 
to represent aspects of the empirical world.” (Stevens, 1946, p. 677) 
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The Ferguson Committee was critical of psychophysical measurement since it was not 
predicated upon the demonstration of an additive relation between sensory intensities. 
Stevens’ introduction of his four types of measurement scales made the Committee’s 
demands look unnecessarily restrictive. The result was that Stevens’ definition came to be 
accepted as the authoritative definition of measurement by the psychological community. 
Stevens had therefore successfully fended off the criticisms levelled at measurement practices 
in psychology and, simultaneously, legitimised his own psychophysical research methods 
through his new definition of measurement. 
 
The case for a quantum measurement paradigm in psychology 
The certain knowledge of classical Newtonian physics emerged as the favoured paradigm for 
psychology in the late 19th century. In particular, the pioneers of experimental psychology 
believed that by modelling the discipline on Newtonian mechanics it would be accepted, in 
Clark Hull’s words, as “a fullblown natural science” (Hull, C.L., 1943, p. 273). The laws of 
Newtonian mechanics are deterministic and they can be used to predict, with certainty, the 
subsequent motion of a macroscopic object if the relevant data are known for the object. 
Gigerenzer (1987) questions why experimental psychologists failed to adopt quantum 
theory as their new paradigm after it emerged in the early part of the 20th century. Such a 
move would have been a natural progression since psychologists were fascinated by classical 
Newtonian physics in the 19th century. The laws of Newtonian physics fail to provide a 
model that can accurately predict the behaviour of microentities such as subatomic particles 
and photons. However, quantum theory provides a framework that is capable of accurately 
accounting for the dynamic attributes of such microentities. Quantum theory accounts for a 
realm that is inherently uncertain; there is no objective reality in the quantum world in the 
sense that microentities do not have dynamic attributes until they are measured. In stark 
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contrast to classical physics, the measurement process actually influences the measured 
values of the attributes. Furthermore, the microentity and the measuring device form a unified 
and inseparable system such that the measured attribute is a joint property of both. 
The quantum pioneer Niels Bohr referred to structural parallels between the study of 
psychological attributes and the study of quantum entities, although he never developed his 
ideas. For example, Bohr (1998, p. 90) expressed the “hope that the epistemological attitude 
which had led to the clarification of the much simpler physical problems [of atomic physics] 
could prove itself helpful also in the discussion of psychological questions”. Bohr believed 
that quantum physics and psychology share a common goal: to use ordinary language to 
communicate unambiguously about what transcends direct experience. The constructs of 
interest to quantum physicists, such as electrons, only manifest themselves in macroscopic 
measuring instruments that can be read by the human eye. Analogously, the constructs of 
interest to psychologists, such as the ability of a child, are not visible to the human eye but, 
rather, must be inferred from what the child writes in a test, for example. 
Gigerenzer indicates that although quantum theory was considered in the 1940s and 
1950s within psychology, it was “unequivocally rejected as a new ideal of science” 
(Gigerenzer, 1987, p. 11). Gigerenzer (1987) argues that quantum theory was rejected as a 
paradigm for psychology because it appeared to contravene two facets of psychology’s quest 
for certain knowledge: determinism and objectivity. Psychologists realised that if they 
adopted quantum theory as their dominant paradigm, the determinism of Newtonian physics 
would be replaced by indeterminism. Gigerenzer (1987) argues that psychologists refused to 
allow objective probabilities to enter their thinking at a fundamental theoretical level as in 
quantum mechanics. Uncertainty in the quantum realm is irreducible in the sense that it does 
not arise because of ignorance on the part of the observer. “Classical ignorance” may occur in 
Newtonian physics when some of the parameters relating to the motion of a macroscopic 
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object are unknown despite the fact they do actually exist, thereby culminating in the need to 
invoke subjective probabilities to describe the outcomes of the motion. Consider, for 
instance, the situation when a fair die is tossed. If the precise initial position and orientation 
of the die, its velocity of projection, the coefficient of restitution between the die and the 
surface upon which it lands, etc. were known, it would be possible to calculate with certainty 
the outcome of the experiment. However, in practice these variables, whilst they exist in 
reality, will be unknown to the casual observer, meaning that the experiment does not have a 
deterministic outcome but, rather, statistical predictions of the possible outcomes of the 
experiment in terms of subjective probabilities must suffice. 
Psychologists were quite prepared to apply probabilities in the following contexts: 
1. To explain the “classical ignorance” inherent in traditional psychological 
measurement models that are predicated on the Newtonian paradigm of classical 
physics, and 
2. To test hypotheses concerning psychological attributes, e.g., using analysis of 
variance. 
Psychologists also found it difficult to accept that objectivity would be undermined by the 
fact that, in quantum theory, the measurer and the measured interact to influence the 
outcomes of measurement. As Gigerenzer (1987, p. 12) puts it, “knowledge is not about 
reality; it is about reality and the knower”. Bohr (1934/1987, p. 119) similarly opines “we are 
both onlookers and actors in the great drama of existence”, which implies that quantum 
mechanics is a “participatory” discipline. 
Gigerenzer (1987) posits that, since the early days of experimental psychology, 
measurements of psychological attributes such as intelligence, perceived loudness, etc. have 
been considered to be independent of the actual instruments used to measure them. This 
assumption of independence is exemplified by the approach taken to the measurement of 
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perceived loudness by the psychophysicist Stevens. In the Newtonian tradition, Stevens 
attempted to measure perceived loudness as a thing-in-itself and he “considered the 
measurement instrument [to be] ... of no theoretical relevance” (Gigerenzer, 1987, p. 17). He 
used two different methods to measure perceived loudness: 
1. Magnitude estimation, which entailed judging the ratio of the loudness of two tones, 
and 
2. Category rating, which entailed judging the interval. 
Stevens used both methods for all subjects involved in the study, but he was shocked to 
discover that the two different measurement methods repeatedly produced inconsistent 
results. If measurements of psychological attributes were independent of the measuring 
instrument used, the results produced by the two methods should have been linearly related. 
Rather than accept the flawed assumption upon which his research was predicated, Stevens 
favoured the measurements produced by the magnitude estimation method and simply 
ignored the values produced by the category rating approach. If Stevens had not taken this 
approach, he would need to have accepted that the measurement methods used were 
theoretically relevant rather than just data capture strategies. As Gigerenzer (1987, p. 17) 
observes, “subjective values, subjective strategies, etc., would be considered as processes that 
were elicited by or dependent upon certain tasks rather than independent of them”. 
Stevens’ work demonstrates that a psychological attribute such as perceived loudness 
cannot be described as a thing-in-itself but, rather, it depends upon the method used to 
measure it. As in the quantum realm, it is only meaningful to refer to a measurement with 
respect to a particular measuring instrument. In Stevens’ work on the measurement of 
perceived loudness, the problem pertaining to the conflicting values generated by the two 
different methods could have been resolved by including a reference to the method used to 
measure a particular value in any measurement report. However, such an approach would 
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have undermined psychologists’ quest for objectivity in their discipline. It would thus appear 
that quantum theory provides a better paradigm for psychological measurement than classical 
Newtonian mechanics since, in quantum theory, the entity measured and the measuring 
instrument form an indivisible whole. 
 
A quantum measurement paradigm for psychological predicates 
The essential characteristics of a quantum measurement paradigm for psychological attributes 
will be described with reference to the measurement of cognitive abilities. In his later 
philosophical writings, Ludwig Wittgenstein provided an extensive analysis of the nature of 
intentional psychological predicates such as learning, understanding, thinking, remembering, 
and so on. The current paper uses facets of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to argue that a 
quantum theoretical model is actually more appropriate than a Newtonian model for the 
measurement of cognitive abilities. 
 Bruner (1996, p. 129) defines learning as following rules to “go beyond the 
information given”, and it is therefore appropriate to consider the philosophical foundations 
of rule-following. Wittgenstein (2009) argues that the source of an individual’s ability to 
follow a rule cannot be a finite object in the individual’s mind, such as a formula or an image. 
According to Wittgenstein, a rule by itself gives rise to the paradox that, under some 
interpretation of its requirements, any answer can be brought into accord or into conflict with 
the rule: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every 
course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. The answer was: if every 
course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can also be brought 
into conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, §201) 
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For example, if a child is asked to evaluate the expression x2  when 3=x , they could attach 
the orthodox interpretation to the instruction and proffer the answer “6”. Alternatively, they 
could, for example, attach an unconventional interpretation, e.g. that evaluating the 
expression x2  entails concatenating 2 and the numerical value of x, and thus give the 
response “23”. 
 Perhaps the inability of a rule by itself to guide a child in its use could be resolved by 
positing that, in addition to the rule, the child must be able to attach the correct interpretation 
to the rule. Alas, a rule plus an interpretation stands logically at the same level as the rule by 
itself, and so this simply leads to an infinite regress: 
If it [the rule] requires interpretation, that could be done in lots of ways. So how do I 
tell which interpretation is correct? Does that, for instance, call for a further rule – a 
rule for determining the correct interpretation of the original – and if so, why does it not 
raise the same difficulty again, thereby generating a regress? (Wright, 2001, p. 163) 
A further possibility is that the simplest interpretation of the rule is privileged. However, 
reasoning based on Gödel’s (1931) incompleteness theorem and Chaitin’s (2007) Algorithmic 
Information Theory undermines this potential route out of paradox: “You can never be sure 
that a computer program is what I like to call elegant, namely that it’s the most concise one 
that produces the output that it produces. Never ever!” (Chaitin, 2007, p. 121) It is tempting 
to propose that the difficulties associated with interpretations could be avoided if there is a 
Platonic mechanism in the child’s mind, that requires no interpretation, but which gives the 
child access to all future uses of a rule. Wittgenstein was vehemently opposed to this 
possibility, as exemplified by his outright rejection of mathematical Platonism: “The 
mathematician is an inventor, not a discoverer” (Wittgenstein, 1978, I, §168). 
 Wittgenstein’s extensive analysis of rule-following leads to the conclusion that, prior 
to a child offering an answer to a rule-governed question (such as the elementary algebraic 
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substitution problem considered above), there are no criteria for determining if the relevant 
rule has been followed correctly. The child is both correct and incorrect prior to saying or 
writing their actual answer: they are in a superposition of two states simultaneously. This is 
analogous to the situation that occurs in quantum theory when, for example, the position of a 
microentity, such as an electron, is measured. Prior to measurement, the electron is in a 
superposition of different states, corresponding to the possible outcomes of the measurement 
process but, when a measurement is made, this superposition collapses to give one actual 
measurement result. 
Wittgenstein argues that it is not possible to follow a rule in one’s mind and that a 
well-established custom or practice, into which one must be trained, is the ultimate arbiter 
between correct and incorrect applications of the rule: 
‘[F]ollowing a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow 
a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking 
one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it. (Wittgenstein, 
2009, §202) 
In the algebraic substitution example considered previously, it is when the child offers the 
answer “6” or the answer “23” that the criteria associated with the practice of evaluating 
algebraic expressions are invoked to adjudge their response to be either correct or incorrect. 
At the instant the child gives their answer to the question, there is a transition from being in a 
superposition of two states (correct and incorrect) to being in a single state (correct or 
incorrect). This is similar to notion of “wave-function collapse” in quantum theory where, for 
example, the probability wave-function, which incorporates information on all possible 
measurement outcomes and their associated probabilities, collapses to yield a single value 
when the position of an electron is measured. 
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In quantum theory, microentities do not possess their dynamic attributes (such as 
position and velocity) intrinsically but, rather, the act of measurement influences the 
attributes. A microentity and the device used to measure one of its dynamic attributes form a 
non-separable system, such that the measured attribute is a joint property of both the 
microentity and the measuring device. An analogous situation occurs when the ability of a 
child to respond correctly to a mathematical problem, such as the algebraic substitution 
example considered above, is measured. According to Wittgenstein (2009), the child’s ability 
does not exist as a thing-in-itself but, rather, it is only meaningful to refer to the ability 
relative to the measuring instrument: the practice of evaluating algebraic expressions. The 
child’s ability to solve the problem is non-separable from the relevant mathematical practice. 
In contemporary psychological measurement models, the probabilities that an 
individual associates with another person’s intentional predicates (such as learning) are 
perceived to be subjective, because the individual does not have direct access to the private 
mental states of the other person. Those aligned with the Cartesian conception of the mind 
posit that there would be no uncertainty, and therefore no need to resort to probabilities, if it 
were possible for the individual to have direct access to the mental states of the other person. 
To put it differently, if God were to look into the mind of the other person, there would be no 
uncertainty; the uncertainty would yield to certainty. Wittgenstein (2009) contends that, when 
a person expresses a thought, for example, they are not describing an inner state with which 
the expression can be checked for accuracy. According to Wittgenstein, mental states cannot 
be construed as mental objects that are analogous to objects in the physical world. Therefore, 
the uncertainty pertaining to the mental predicates of another person cannot be reduced by 
inspecting their mental states, since those states do not exist as things-in-themselves which 
bear comparison with what the person subsequently says, writes or does. The uncertainty is 
not a consequence of ignorance. 
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The distinctive feature of the inner seems to be that it has to be guessed at from the 
outer of the other person and is known only from within. But when through accurate 
consideration this conception vanishes into thin air, the inner indeed has not become the 
outer, but for us there is no longer direct inner evidence and indirect outer evidence for 
the inner. (von Wright, 1982, p. 33) 
While uncertainty in measuring physical attributes of objects arises from instrument 
fallibility and human limitations, the uncertainty associated with measuring psychological 
predicates is constitutive, and not a shortcoming of any sort. Uncertainty in predicting the 
weather reflects shortcomings in the instrumentation used, but the vagueness of psychological 
predicates is not a shortcoming or deficiency. Wittgenstein explains the constitutive nature of 
the uncertainty in psychological measurement using the notion of “thermometer pain”: 
One could imagine that to determine whether someone is in pain a kind of clinical 
thermometer is used. If a human being cries or moans, they take his temperature and 
only if this shows such and such a sign, they start to pity the one who suffers and to 
treat him the way we treat the one who is ‘clearly in pain’. (von Wright, 1982, p. 50) 
Clearly Wittgenstein is using this bizarre notion to make a point. The thermometer is 
designed to reduce uncertainty; if someone is feigning pain, the thermometer reading will 
find them out. However, the same predicate is not being measured with greater accuracy 
using the thermometer; rather an entirely different predicate from our everyday conception of 
pain, pain*, say, is being measured. Therefore, the uncertainty in psychological measurement 
is irreducible and probabilities associated with measurement values are objective rather than 
subjective. This resonates with the irreducible nature of uncertainty in quantum theoretical 
measurements. 
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 The implications of this transition from a Newtonian to a quantum theoretical 
measurement paradigm for one particular type of psychological measurement, educational 
measurement, are considered in the following section.  
 
Implications for educational measurement: PISA 
Psychological measurement models are used extensively to underpin research and policy 
formulation in education. For example, the Rasch (1960) model is the basis of the OECD’s 
PISA, which aims to evaluate the efficacy of the education systems of OECD member 
nations. PISA entails a tri-annual assessment of the skills of 15 year-olds in reading, 
mathematics, science, problem solving and financial literacy. National governments 
recognise the importance of monitoring and evaluating their education systems to facilitate 
public accountability and, ultimately, to improve the quality of education. International 
comparisons such as PISA have become a key part of this process. Policymakers are 
significantly influenced by such comparative studies, and a direct relationship between a 
country’s educational achievement and its economic potential is frequently posited: “Students 
who demonstrate high achievement levels are more likely to be productive workers and 
members of society when they leave the education system.” (OECD, 1996, p. 193) 
The use of international league tables such as those generated by PISA has the potential 
to, for example, influence foreign direct investment in a nation and it is therefore not 
surprising that PISA results have the capacity to throw a country’s schooling regime into 
turmoil. This is exemplified by the widely publicised German “PISA shock” which occurred 
in the aftermath of Germany achieving comparatively low scores in PISA 2000. Heated 
debate ensued regarding necessary changes to the country’s education system: “The PISA 
results and their reception in the German context led to appeals for a reform of secondary 
education from almost all relevant social groups, including political parties, employers, trade 
27 
 
unions (including teachers’ associations), parents’ associations and academics.” (Ertl, 2006, 
p. 621) Similar controversy occurred when the Japanese government used the PISA 2003 
results to legitimise contentious education policy decisions (Takayama, 2008). 
Since educational testing is a powerful activity that has the potential to impact 
considerably on society, it is evident that it must be predicated upon a secure measurement 
paradigm. There have been numerous critiques of PISA (see, for example, Bonnet, 2002; 
Prais, 2003; Goldstein, 2004; Grisay and Monseur, 2007; Dohn, 2007), which raise doubts 
about underlying theoretical and methodological issues in the assessment paradigm. The 
current paper has questioned the mathematical and philosophical foundations of 
psychological measurement models such as that utilised in PISA, and the implications for 
PISA of a transition to a quantum theoretical approach to psychological measurement are 
now elucidated. 
Item response theory attempts to relate the level of a psychological construct, such as 
ability, possessed by an individual to their performance on the discrete items of a test 
designed to measure the construct. According to Raykov and Marcoulides (2011, p. 247), the 
dominant assumption of item response theory is that “the responses on items of a test under 
consideration (and consequently overall test performance) can be accounted for by one or 
more latent abilities or constructs”. 
Psychologists/educationalists posit that an individual possesses an intrinsic ability, θ, 
which is the source of the individual’s performance on a given test item. Since the intrinsic 
ability cannot be measured directly, item response models have been developed as a 
mechanism for estimating the intrinsic ability level. These are mathematical models relating 
the probability of an individual responding correctly to a test item to the individual’s ability 
level and properties of the item. Raykov and Marcoulides (2011) consider a number of 
different item response models, such as the one-parameter logistic model: 
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In this model, which is equivalent to the Rasch (1960) model that underpins PISA, the 
following notation is used: 
)θ(gP  = probability of individual giving a correct response to item g 
θ = ability level of individual 
e = base of the natural logarithm function 
gb  = difficulty level of item g, i.e. value of θ for which 5.0)θ( =gP . 
Mathematical techniques are used in conjunction with item response models to estimate the 
ability level, θ, of an individual on the basis of their responses to the items on a test. In so 
doing, it is assumed that the ability level, θ, of the individual is a thing-in-itself which can be 
abstracted away from the measuring instrument. 
If a Newtonian model of psychological/educational measurement is rejected in favour 
of a quantum-theoretical paradigm, as suggested in the current paper, it is meaningless to 
refer to the ability of an individual as a thing-in-itself that is the source of the individual’s 
responses to the items on a test. Rather, it would only be meaningful to refer to the 
individual’s ability with respect to each discrete test item at the instant when he/she actually 
responds to the item. It is evident, therefore, that a quantum theoretical basis for 
psychological measurement gives rise to serious conceptual problems for item response 
theory. Since PISA utilises the Rasch (1960) model as its theoretical basis, the proposed 
transition from a Newtonian to a quantum theoretical measurement model would have critical 
implications for the validity and reliability of PISA data and thus render the PISA study to be 
a meaningless exercise. A measurement project such as PISA is simply untenable under a 
quantum theoretical framework. 
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Conclusion 
Michell (1999) specifies two conditions, which he attributes to Helmholtz, for empirically 
testing if an attribute is a continuous quantity, i.e., if it is measurable in the Newtonian sense: 
1. There must be a method for comparing objects which permits the determination of 
whether or not two objects are the same with respect to the attribute, and 
2. The attribute must possess an additive structure in the sense that there must be a 
method for combining objects in a way that demonstrates additivity of the attribute 
concerned. 
According to Michell (1999, p. 71), additivity of an attribute is demonstrated if there 
is an actual physical process for combining magnitudes of the attribute so that: 
i. wxxw +=+  for any two magnitudes, w and x, of the attribute, and 
ii. )()( yxwyxw ++=++  for any three magnitudes w, x and y of the attribute, 
and 
iii. The combined magnitude is unchanged if equivalent objects are substituted – 
objects which have the same magnitudes as the individual objects that are 
being combined. 
Michell (1999, p. 74) stresses that, as an alternative to the above direct tests for quantitative 
structure, there are indirect methods for testing if an attribute is a continuous quantity, such as 
conjoint measurement theory (Luce and Tukey, 1964). Michell (1997, p. 358) cautions, 
however, that “the practice of measurement requires getting some grip, either directly or 
indirectly, upon the additive structure of the attribute in order that ratios between magnitudes 
of the attribute may be discovered or estimated”. 
In Michell’s view, the psychological community failed to demonstrate that 
psychological attributes actually possess an additive structure, and simply imposed their own 
definition of measurement through their journals and textbooks. Michell’s thesis is that 
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psychologists simply pronounced their discipline to be a quantitative one and subsequently 
stifled debate on the issue. Michell (1997, p. 374) portrays psychological measurement as a 
“methodological thought disorder” and he expresses serious concerns about the scientific 
basis of current measurement practices in psychology. Michell’s extensive work on the 
foundations of psychological measurement demonstrates that the measurement of 
psychological predicates and, by extension educational predicates, does not conform to a 
Newtonian paradigm. However, I contend that Michell is making the mistake of holding 
psychology to an inappropriate standard. Michell is wrong to assume that measurement in 
psychology is a mechanism for checking up on the values of pre-existing mental attributes. 
This type of measurement is the preserve of Newtonian physics. 
Michell failed to consider the possibility that a quantum theoretical rather than a 
Newtonian paradigm may actually offer a more secure basis for psychological measurement. 
The current paper has initiated the debate concerning this lacuna in Michell’s work. 
However, further research at a fundamental philosophical level is necessary to more fully 
investigate the structural parallels between quantum measurement in physics and the 
measurement of psychological predicates. In particular, given the significance attached to 
high stakes assessments such as PISA by policymakers, the author believes that a re-appraisal 
of the philosophical foundations of psychological/educational measurement is necessary 
forthwith. 
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